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ABSTRACT
Advertisers employ bare-skinned models and sex appeal to seduce American consumers with every
magazine, billboard, and television advertisement. The ubiquity of sexual gratification has reached
a tangible quality in American culture, but sex is still somehow taboo in our legal system. Despite
the vast market for online adult entertainment, obscenity laws have been used to strike down claims
for adult content copyright owners. These content owners are producing creative sexual expression
for the public benefit, but they are being denied the same economic incentives granted to their
mainstream counterparts. Ironically, Playboy Co. is an outlier in the adult entertainment industry
as it has continually enjoyed enforcement of its adult content copyrights. Multiple judges have
argued that explicit adult content is obscene, and therefore, is neither protected by copyright or the
First Amendment. This comment argues that there is, in actuality, a hetero-patriarchal judicial bias
to blame for the lack of protection in adult content copyright. Further, it argues that these content
evaluations violate the core copyright policy of encouraging creative work for the public benefit.
Finally, it recommends that the Copyright Act should be amended to reflect the virtual omnipotence
of the internet and the growing demand for digital sexual content by rewarding adult content
providers through enforcement of valid explicit content copyrights.
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CYBERSEX: PROTECTING SEXUAL CONTENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
NICOLE CHANEY*
INTRODUCTION
Sex has evolved to signify a variety of different things in American culture.1 Its
manifestations have moved past mere reproduction to generate perpetual controversy
in government regulation of sex with regard to public health, safety and morals.2
One such manifestation is the realm of adult entertainment, which has elicited
debate among a broad spectrum of social groups.3 Evidence suggests that the social
acceptance of adult entertainment media is just another obstacle to inter-gender
equality.4 Further, evidence suggests that any negative connotations about adult
content do not harm its consumer appeal.5
As a vast majority of adult content is marketed solely on the internet and
internet usage increases exponentially, adult content producers have had an

* © Nicole L. Chaney, J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The John Marshall Law School; B.A.
American Culture and B.A. English Language & Literature, May 2008, University of
Michigan. Throughout my academic career, I have always been most inspired by my studies in
gender, sexuality, and feminist theory. In writing this comment, I hope that this passion
compliments my interests in intellectual property law. I would like to thank Garrett, Gibson, and
Momma B, whose love has continually kept me motivated. I would like to give a special thanks to
my editor, Thomas Bacon, for his patience, guidance, and support throughout the candidacy
process. Finally, thank you to my colleagues at The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property
Law for all of their editorial assistance.
1 See generally Lisa Duggan, From Instincts to Politics: Writing the History of Sexuality in the
U.S., in THE JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH, 95, 99–102 (1990) (discussing the changing landscape of
sex in America).
2 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660–61 (1887) (defining the limits of the government to
intervene in public matters without due process of law); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(securing guarantee of due process rights for American citizens).
3 See Duggan, supra note 1, at 100 (noting “the current wave of panic over pornography”);
Eleanor Heartney, Pornography, 50 ART J. 16, 16–19 (1991) (stating that “[t]he pornography issue
brings to the fore a basic American uneasiness with sexuality, with nonconformity, the existence of
marginal groups and behaviors, with so called “deviant” philosophies.”).
4 Duggan, supra note 1, at 100–06 (tracing the repression of female sexuality and discussing
various “moral panics” or “sex panics” including miscegenation, HIV/AIDS, military lesbianism and
lesbianism in general, and changing perceptions about sexual violence against women); see generally
GLORIA STEINEM, I was a Playboy Bunny, in OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 32–75
(Henry Holt & Co., LLC, Second Own Books ed. 1995).
5 Surprising
Internet
Usage
Statistics,
NEB.
INFO.
TECH.
COMM’N,
http://nitc.nebraska.gov/news/0303/EC_Internetusagestatistics.htm (last visited June 5, 2011).
The No. 1 search term used at search engine sites is the word “sex” . . . Users
searched for “sex” more than other terms such as “games,” “travel,” “music,”
“jokes,” “cars,” “weather,” “health” and “jobs” combined. The study also found that
"pornography/porno" was the fourth-most searched for subject. . . . Other studies
show statistical evidence that more than half of all internet searches are “adultoriented,” and that there are between two and eight million internet pornography
subscribers paying an approximate net total of $800 million in 2002.
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The rise of peer-to-peer file
increased incentive to protect original adult content.6
sharing (“P2P”) has made data exchange convenient, fast, and free for many users.7
Numerous programs simply require the user to click a file to download it onto his or
her computer.8
However, an overwhelming influx of illegal downloads has
threatened the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners.9 The P2P dilemma has
been particularly difficult for the adult entertainment industry as incidents of
infringement have increased dramatically.10
Adult content producers have responded by waging legal battles against online
“pirates.”11 However, these battles have reached a stalemate due to unenforceable
standards against internet infringers.12 Courts have enforced greater copyright
protection to non-sexual media in similar suits.13 Even more striking is the
divergence in enforcement within the adult content industry, as the infamous
Playboy Co. consistently prevails on the majority of its copyright suits and other
adult content providers struggle for judicial recognition as copyright owners.14
6 S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 112 (1998) (“Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied
and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their
works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected
against massive piracy.”); see also Report or Affidavit of Mark F. Mauceri at ¶ 4, Flynt v. Flynt
Media Corp., No. 09-CV-00048, 2009 WL 2057732 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2009) [hereinafter Mauceri
Affidavit] (suggesting that internet is the dominant form of dissemination in the field, that the
paying audience was stable prior to the internet, and that the audience was willing to pay for the
product before the internet).
7 Mauceri Affidavit, supra note 6, at ¶ 4 (discussing market prior to internet); see Joseph
Menn, Porn Producer Vivid Sues Video Site: PornoTube and its Parent Firm are Accused of Profiting
from Piracy, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/11/business/fi-vivid11.
8 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001); MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005).
9 A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1013; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 U.S. at 913.
10 See A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1013; Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 913; see also Anand Bhatt,
Why Digital Rights Management is Doomed to Failure, ADULT VIDEO NETWORK (May 1, 2003),
http://business.avn.com/articles/video/DRM-Versus-P2P-Point-Counterpoint-38967.html.
11 Menn, supra note 7, stating that:
We’ve decided to take a stand and say ‘no more,’ Vivid co-Chairman Steven Hirsch
said . . . . He said Internet piracy might be reducing his company’s profit 35
[percent]. Since copyright infringement suits have been unsuccessful, some adult
content owners have even taken this battle into their own hands by hiring
organizations like Takedown Piracy who have been credited with removing over
2.3 million infringements since April 2009.
Id. See Nate Glass, Take Down Piracy Celebrates 2.3 Million Infringements Removed, ADULT VIDEO
NETWORK (Apr. 8, 2011, 1:27 PM), http://business.avn.com/articles/technology/Takedown-PiracyCelebrates-2-3-Million-Infringements-Removed-431906.html.
12 Hard Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011); On the
Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. C10-4472, 2011 WL 4018258, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).
13 Hard Drive Prod., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1165; contra Call of the Wild Movie, LLC, v. Smith, 274
F.R.D. at 345–46 (permitting joinder of defendants who had downloaded a film without explicit
sexual conduct); contra Voltage Pictures, LLC., v. Does 1-5,000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 45 (D.D.C.
2011).
14 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(granting summary judgment in favor of Playboy’s copyright infringement claim against a CD-ROM
manufacturer who copied images onto discs without authorization); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1177–78 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (granting summary judgment and
awarding $5,000 for each infringed copyright image where defendants were jointly and severally
liable to plaintiff for direct and contributory infringement); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Eddie Davidson,

[11:815 2012] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

818

Part I of this article will illuminate First Amendment concerns, copyright
protections and policies, and the reach of these legal principles into applicable adult
media case law. Part II will discuss how courts have used Playboy Co. imagery as a
standard to define the boundaries of protectable sexual content copyright, which
contradicts the core policies of intellectual property law. Part III will suggest that
the online infringement battle will remain unresolved in the adult content industry
until legislators eliminate these sexually preferential judicial biases.
I. BACKGROUND
Intellectual property laws grew out of a need to create legislation reflecting
modern concerns regarding inventions, artistic endeavors, and other creative
works.15 As such, the field requires constant reevaluation of cultural, commercial,
and legal values.16 Intellectual property rights stem from two separate clauses in the
Constitution,17 and arising claims are subject to federal jurisdiction.18 This section
will provide important context for the argument by describing basic copyright
principles and policies, the underpinnings of the obscenity debate, and the evolution
of the adult entertainment industry from its origin through the digital age.
A. Learning Copy-Right From Wrong
Authors of copyrightable material are entitled to protections under the Federal
Copyright Act of 1976.19 Prior to the Congressional adoption of the act, copyright was
protected by state common law or federal statutory law.20 However, since these laws
are subject to federal preemption by the Act, they have offered only a limited basis of

No. 1:97-CV-2787, 1999 WL 246739, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1999) (entering default judgment in
favor of Playboy in the amount of $120,000 in statutory damages where defendant displayed
copyrighted images in its website for end-users to download without publisher authorization).
15 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:4
(4th ed. 2011) (discussing commonality among patents, trademarks, and copyrights).
16 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (citing public benefit as main
purpose of copyright law and reward to copyright owner as secondary purpose); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (discussing economic philosophy in copyright policy by encouraging innovation
and creativity through personal gain to advance public welfare in science and the useful arts);
Washingtonian Pub. Co., v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939) (discussing legislative intent in
protecting copyright to encourage production of creative works); see also Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–51 (1903) (identifying previously unrecognized copyright of
pictorial illustrations as copyrightable subject matter).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (granting Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006).
19 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006).
20 1-1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 (2011)
[hereinafter NIMMER] (explaining how the Copyright Act of 1976 impacted preexisting laws).
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protection.21 The Copyright Act of 1976, however, grants copyright owners federally
protected exclusive ownership rights including the reproduction right.22
Congressional power to create the Copyright Act stems from a constitutional
clause commonly referred to as the Copyright Clause.23 Accordingly, the underlying
foundational purpose of the act is to expand availability of creative works to the
public while encouraging creative works through financial incentive.24 As such, this
intellectual property right inures to the commercial gain of copyright owners;25
however, its essential function is to promote creativity as a benefit for the general
public.26
According to the Supreme Court, rewarding copyright owners is
secondary to the copyright policy of promoting innovation for overall public benefit.27
In order for a work to qualify for copyright registration, it must be original and
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”28 Copyright protection functions as an
incentive by protecting authors from wrongful appropriation of valuable work, and
rewards them by bestowing a “bundle” of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work.29
In providing such substantial rights for creative works, copyright protection is
subject only to a mild content-based analysis.30 Content has been a hotly contested
Id. (discussing preemption of statutory copyright law).
17 U.S.C. § 106.
23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (discussing economic philosophy in rewarding
copyright creators).
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
26 1-1 NIMMER, supra note 20, § 1.03. See also Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158 (“The
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”).
Still, traditional copyright legislation “was intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights
to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford greater encouragement to
the production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the world.” Washingtonian Pub.
Co., Inc., v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 (1954) stating that:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such
creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Id.
27 Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158 (stating that copyright law, like the patent statutes,
makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration).
28 17 U.S.C. § 102.
29 See 1-1 NIMMER, supra note 20, § 1.03.
30 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (discussing fair use
statutory factor that looks to nature of work).
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or
the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first
time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any
public, they have a commercial value,-it would be bold to say that they have not
an aesthetic and educational value,-and the taste of any public is not to be treated
with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes
21
22
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topic in the field of copyright because of potential First Amendment conflicts and the
potential chilling effect on speech.31 This content-based analysis has often isolated
adult film entertainment from the rest of the entertainment world because
conservative legal scholars do not believe that copyright protection should extend to
sexually explicit adult media.32
Copyright case law demonstrates that, on the one hand, some courts are willing
to extend copyright protection to sexually explicit adult media.33 On the other hand,
while many courts have expressed hesitance in offering copyright protection for
obscene material,34 the impact is disproportionately administered onto certain
sexually explicit adult media.35
B. The Miller Test As Obscenely Passé
The underlying policies of the First Amendment and Copyright law have collided
with regard to questions of obscenity. Obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment resulting in additional obstacles for the adult entertainment industry.36
Obscenity has been the turning point in the adult content copyright analysis as
legislators express concerns about protecting the public from unwanted exposure to
obscene material.37

Id.

for a change. That these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently
shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights.

31 E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing
the value in an artistic work even though it may be offensive to some people’s sensibilities).
32 Devils Films, Inc., v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (identifying
pornographic films as obscene and refusing to enforce copyright protection on this basis); Hard Drive
Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
33 MCGIP, LLC., v. Does 1-18, No. C. 11 1495, 2011 WL 2181620, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 2,
2011). Some sexuality explicit films have valid copyright registration and courts have permitted
copyright infringement suits to proceed against unnamed defendants without evaluating the
copyrighted works’ content. Id; see Boy Racer v. Does 2-71, No. 5:11 Civ. 02833, 2011 WL 2784574,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011); First Time Videos, LLC., v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 244 (N.D. Ill.
2011); see also, Int’l Media Films, Inc. v. Lucas Entm’t, Inc, 703 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466–67 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (holding that trademark owner failed to demonstrate a valid copyright in its claim against an
adult film company who had created a pornographic adaptation of the work in the public domain).
34 Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
35 Id. at 175 (categorizing more than 200 titles as obscene based on categorical identifications
of “Straight Anal,” “Lesbian,” and “Transsexual”); contra Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g
Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433, 437 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (analyzing only infringement claims and not
mentioning sexual nature of content; referring to copyrighted work as “images” or “photography”
and not “pornography”); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1171–78 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (analyzing copyright infringement without assessing nature of sexual content; referring
to copyrighted work as “images” or “photography” and not “pornography”).
36 See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (holding that obscene material not subject to
First Amendment protections and expressly permitting the regulation of works depicting sexual
conduct); see also Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (holding that copyrighted work with obscene
content did not warrant grant of injunction; Hard Drive, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (refusing to join
unnamed infringers of copyrighted adult film); On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. C10-4472,
2011 WL 4018258, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (dismissing 5009 unnamed infringers and denying
copyright owners to conduct early discovery to determine the identities of the unnamed defendants).
37 Miller, 413 U.S. at 18–19.

[11:815 2012]

Cybersex: Protecting Sexual Content
in the Digital Age

821

The Supreme Court addressed this issue at length in the 1973 landmark
obscenity case, Miller v. California.38 The case involved a violation of a criminal
obscenity statute in California where the defendant had distributed unsolicited
brochures advertising sexually explicit books and films.39 The court examined prior
obscenity law and distinguished it by setting up a three-part test for identifying
obscene material.40 The test looks to “whether ‘the average person, applying
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest[;] whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and [w]hether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.”41 This historic precedent, now known as the Miller test,
has failed to provide a consistent standard and many courts are still struggling to
apply it. The standard has resulted in subjective and arbitrary findings of obscenity,
and an unsettled future for enforcement of adult content copyright.
C. Copyright Policy and Explicit Dis-Content
In 1979, the Fifth Circuit refused to bar plaintiffs from relief in a copyright
infringement suit where the defendant had alleged the original work was obscene.42
While still good law, the decision was distinguished by the Second Circuit in 1998
when the court denied an injunction for adult film copyright on the basis that the
material was obscene.43 The Second Circuit argued that copyright protection should
not extend to obscene material because “[o]nce a court has determined that
copyrighted material is obscene, there seems no reason to require it to expend its
resources on behalf of a plaintiff who it could as readily be trying for a violation of the
federal criminal law.”44
While circuits have been split on the issue,45 most judges have remained
hesitant about regulating substantive content. Many believe that barring protection
of original works contradicts the copyright policy of fostering creative growth.46 An
Id.
Id. at 17–18.
40 Id. at 24.
41 Id. at 23–24.
42 Mitchell Bros. Film Grp., v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 866 (5th Cir. 1979).
43 Devils Films, Inc., v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“the strong
public policy against the distribution of obscene material compels the conclusion that the Court
should not exercise its equitable powers to benefit the plaintiff.”).
44 Id. at 175 (explaining that where the plaintiff was violating 18 U.S.C. section 1466, “which
makes it a felony to engage in the business of selling or transferring obscene material shipped in
interstate commerce.”).
45 Compare Mitchell Bros. Film, 604 F.2d at 866 (discussing perspective against copyright
content restrictions) with Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 176–77 (opposing copyright protection
where works are obscene).
46 See Mitchell Bros. Film, 604 F.2d at 855 (“From the first copyright act in 1790, Congress has
seldom added restrictions on copyright based on the subject matter of the work, and in each instance
has later removed the content restriction.”); id. (explaining that “Congress has been hostile to
content-based restrictions on copyrightability,” and that “the legislative history of the 1976 Act
reveals that Congress intends to continue the policy of the 1909 Act of avoiding content restrictions
on copyrightability”).
38
39
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evaluation of sexual adult media copyright has resulted in debate about the
balancing of protection for obscene material, copyright policy, and First Amendment
interests.47
In Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, the copyright owner
owned a valid copyright in a pornographic film.48 The infringement occurred when
the theater displayed the film without a license or the owner’s consent.49 The
infringer attempted to evade liability by claiming that the copyright owner was
barred from relief because the material was obscene.50 The court held that his
defense was an illegitimate basis for denying the copyright owner’s rights and
contradicted copyright policy in so doing.51
In Mitchell, the film at issue, Behind the Green Door, was a full-length sex film
depicting a young white woman who is kidnapped and forced to perform sex acts on
multiple partners at the same time in front of an audience.52 In evaluating whether
this work was copyrightable, the court stated that there was little evidence to suggest
that obscenity should be a part of the copyright analysis.53 It stated that by reading
obscenity into copyright, it could have a chilling effect on speech.54 The court further
stated that every content-based restriction on copyright to that point had been
removed.55 It ultimately refused to reach the question about whether this film was
considered obscene, but not before it discussed the “practical difficulties” of applying
the Miller test because of the fact that “what is obscene in one local community may
be non-obscene protected speech in another.”56 The scope of this decision, however,
was severely narrowed three decades later within similar facts.
In the contrasting case of Devils Films v. Nectar Video, the district court
narrowed this holding.57 While refusing to comment on whether obscenity and
copyright are compatible, the court determined that the content at issue was obscene
and left the parties where they stood.58 At issue in this case were more than 200

47 See generally Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (holding that obscene speech is not
protected by the First Amendment). The foregoing debate is colored by the fifth circuit’s recognition
of Miller where the Supreme Court held that “[s]ince what is obscene in one local community may be
non-obscene protected speech in another, and the copyright statute does not in other respects vary
in its applicability from locality to locality.” Id. The fifth circuit court argued that Congressional
obscenity exception to copyright would spur substantial First Amendment concerns; Mitchell Bros.
Film, 604 F.2d at 866.
48 Mitchell Bros. Film, 604 F.2d at 854.
49 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
50 Mitchell Bros. Film, 604 F.2d at 854 (explaining that the defendants relied on the doctrine of
unclean hands to duck the owner’s request for equitable relief).
51 Id. The claimant’s “alleged wrongful conduct ha[d] not changed the equitable relationship
between [the parties] and ha[d] not injured the defendants in any way.” Id. at 863. The court held
that “infringers’ attempt to immunize” themselves was "antithetical to the purpose of [copyright]
laws.” Id. at 865.
52 LINDA WILLIAMS, HARD CORE: POWER, PLEASURE, AND THE “FRENZY OF THE VISIBLE” 243
(Univ. of California Press,1999).
53 Mitchell Bros. Film, 604 F.2d at 854.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 855.
56 Id. at 858.
57 Devils Films, Inc., v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
58 Id. at 175.
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major commercial titles.59 Rather than determining whether the specific content was
obscene, the court viewed only three of the videotapes, and based on the
categorizations of “straight anal,” “lesbian,” and “transsexual,” the court determined
that the films were obscene.60 Without delving into the nature of the works, the
court went on to state that the videotapes were “hardcore pornography bereft of any
plot and with very little dialogue.”61
In Devils Films, the infringer sold the owner’s explicit pornographic films
without license or consent,62 but the court struck down the copyright owner’s claim.63
The court found that the “strong public policy against the distribution of obscene
material” outweighed the copyright owner’s right to protection.64 Despite valid
copyright, public demand, and unauthorized use of the owner’s creative work, the
court refused to protect the works because of the nature of the content at issue.
D. Sexual Interest and Industry Players
Despite the IP protections in place, many adult entertainment providers have
been unsuccessful at asserting IP rights.65 At best, obscenity has a strained
correlation with intellectual property, but still dominates courts’ rationales in
rejecting adult film copyright infringement claims.66 At the very least, it is apparent
that courts resist protecting a particular type of sexualized content.67
1. The American Playboy
Hailed as an “American cultural icon,”68 Playboy Co. started out as a “[s]o-called
lad magazine” focusing only on “soft porn.”69 The adult content provider now sells
over 3.4 million copies of its magazine each month in the United States alone.70 The
popular Playboy Clubs of the 1960s left little room for the equitable inclusion of
female sexuality,71 despite claims to the contrary.72 The core audience was traveling

Id.
Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 175–76.
The owner sought preliminary injunction, so the court did not have to
determine with precision whether obscenity was a valid defense to infringement. As a result,
Mitchell Bros. Film is still good law, but it is distinguished by this decision.
64 Id. at 176-177.
65 See id.; see also IO Grp., Inc., v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
66 Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
67 Id. at 175–77.
68 Michael J. McCarthy, Playboy to Revive Club, and Bunnies, in Vegas, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6,
2004).
69 Id.
70 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
71 McCarthy, supra note 68; see STEINEM, supra note 4, at 32–75.
72 Larry
Dubois,
Playboy
Interview:
Hugh
Hefner,
PLAYBOY,
http://www.playboy.com/magazine/hugh-hefner-interview last visited June 5, 2012). Hefner states
59
60
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businessmen,73 and the Club was “a socially sanctioned meeting place” until its
female market increased and the “clubs fell out of favor.”74 The Playboy Co. market,
consistent since the magazine’s birth in December 1953,75 still caters to “its core
companywide demographic [of] young men ages 18 to 34.”76 Its first issue featured
the infamous Marilyn Monroe, and the magazine has since gained a reputation for
showcasing beautiful blonde bombshells.77
Evidence of Playboy Co.’s gender ideology is strongly indicated by the company’s
stylistic choices.78 The magazine’s founder, Hugh Hefner, stated in an interview
that, “[f]emale virginity has been prized in our society simply because an unused
possession is valued more highly than a used one. It’s part of our Judaeo-Christian
heritage that women are either ‘good girls’ or ‘bad girls’ – on the basis of their sexual
behavior.”79 He continued, “The extent to which our Bunnies have become known
around the world suggests that we were right; the word Bunny has even entered the
language as a synonym for a pretty girl.”80
The Playboy magazine has enjoyed remarkable success due to its stylistic
choices and accessible nature at a time when nude photographs were not available
from a multitude of sources.81 Playboy Co.’s business empire reached $200,000,000
in profit.82 The corporation has obtained copyright protection for its works and has
since litigated a number of times to protect its works against infringement.83
Playboy Co. has prevailed on these claims without being subjected to an obscenity
analysis.84
Lastly, the Supreme Court has recognized that Playboy Co.’s
programming is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment and that adults
have a constitutional right to view it.85
that women would be the real beneficiaries of his work. Id; contra STEINEM, supra note 4 at 32–75
(exposing the nature of the business in the original Playboy Clubs as exploiting the “bunnies”).
73 McCarthy, supra note 68.
74 Id.
75 Dubois, supra note 72.
76 McCarthy, supra note 68.
77 Dubois, supra note 72.
78 See id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing statistic that
Playboy sells over 3.4 million issues of its magazine each month in the United States).
82 Dubois, supra note 72.
83 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(granting summary judgment in favor of Playboy’s copyright infringement claim); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1177–78 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (granting summary judgment
and awarding $5000 for each infringed Playboy copyright image); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Eddie
Davidson, No. 1:97-CV-2787, 1999 WL 246739, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1999) (entering default
judgment in favor of Playboy where defendant displayed copyrighted images on its website without
publisher authorization).
84 Starware Publ’g., 900 F. Supp. at 433–38 (analyzing only infringement claims and not
mentioning sexual nature of content; referring to copyrighted work as “images” or “photographs” and
not “pornography”); Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. at 1171–78 (analyzing copyright infringement without
assessing nature of sexual content; referring to copyrighted work as “images” or “photography” and
not “pornography”); Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Dumas and Dumas Inc., 840 F. Supp. 256, 256–60
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (identifying plaintiff only as “magazine publisher” without identifying the subject
matter of the magazine).
85 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000).
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2. Outside the Bunnies’ Domain
While Playboy Co. still rules the print world, other players have exploited the
internet’s ability to communicate on a massive scale by widely disseminating adult
media online. As internet usage has increased, so has consumer demand for sexually
explicit content online.86 Evidence demonstrates that consumers view the internet as
the most desirable way to retrieve adult content.87 Adult content producers have
filled this demand by fashioning commercial websites where such content may be
retrieved.88 Even Playboy Co. began to “[tiptoe] into the adult-film market” to recoup
financial losses that they attributed to increased availability of “hard-core” content.89
In order to protect original content, adult content providers looked to copyright
protection.90 With the expansion of internet media and the growth of P2P
technology,91 Playboy Co. entered the market and enjoyed the same level of copyright
protection that they already had.92 The rest of adult content providers, in contrast,
have experienced a significant burden in exercising the exclusive rights laid out in
the Copyright Act.93 Where adult content producers have not gained the level of

Id.

As this case has been litigated, it is not alleged to be obscene; adults have a
constitutional right to view it; the Government disclaims any interest in
preventing children from seeing it or hearing it with the consent of their parents;
and Playboy has concomitant rights under the First Amendment to transmit it.
These points are undisputed.

86 See Surprising Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 5 (estimating that pornography would
almost double its revenue in five years time and citing data regarding the prevalence of the words
“sex” and “pornography” in internet searches).
87 Mauceri Affidavit, supra note 6, at ¶4 (“Leading up to just before the Internet became a
dominant force in the dissemination of pornography, the paying audience was considered captive,
and remained highly profitable year after year.”).
88 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 856–57 (1997) (“There is evidence to suggest that adult
users, particularly casual Web browsers, would be discouraged from retrieving information that
required use of a credit card or password.”).
89 McCarthy, supra note 68. Playboy’s financial losses required them to change their content so
that they could compete in the market. Id. “Revenue from the entertainment division, which
includes the Playboy TV cable channel, more than doubled over the past decade to $203 million [in
2007]. Revenue from licensed products grew to $43 million [in 2007] from $7 million in 1998.” Id.
See also Russell Adams, Playboy’s Chief to Step Down, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2008) (stating that
Playboy’s licensed products includes its “vast collection of mugs, calendars, cocktail shakers and
other logo merchandise . . . Meanwhile, publishing revenue has declined 32% over the 10 years and
now accounts for less than a third of total revenue, compared with 44% a decade ago.”).
90 See e.g., Hard Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. C 10-4472, 2011 WL 4018258, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6,
2011); MCGIP, LLC. v. Does 1-18, No. C. 11-1495, 2011 WL 2181620, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011);
Boy Racer v. Does 2-71, No. 5:11 Civ. 02833, 2011 WL 2784574, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011); First
Time Videos, LLC., v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 244 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
91 Reno, 521 U.S. at 885 (citing expansion of internet media and evidence of accessibility of
explicit content online).
92 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433, 433–48 (S.D. Fla. 1995);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1171–78 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
93 Devils Films, Inc., v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that
copyrighted work was obscene and did not warrant grant of injunction where content could be
categorized based on sodomy or homosexual interest; Hard Drive Prod., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1165
(refusing to join unnamed infringers of copyrighted amateur adult film); On the Cheap, LLC., 2011
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notoriety and mainstream recognition as Playboy Co., they have also been largely
unsuccessful in litigating against online infringers.94
The unwillingness to incorporate explicit adult content into mainstream legal
protections, however, is inconsistent with American cultural demands.95 Although
courts have rejected the basis of a national community standard regarding sexual
content,96 expansion of the internet warrants a reevaluation of this precedent.97
E. C Words – COICA, Copyright, and Censorship
Congress has attempted to solve the problem of internet piracy through
measures in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”),98 and more recently in
The Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeit Act (“COICA”).99 COICA was
designed to provide a cause of action for copyright owners that have been injured by
online piracy.100 The proposed legislation would have permitted injured parties to
seek relief by filing an application with the Attorney General.101 Upon application,
the court would essentially shut down the allegedly infringing website.102 While this
legislation would have provided much needed assistance for copyright owners,103 it
posed unjustifiable secondary risks for unintended parties like legitimate online

WL 4018258, at *2 (dismissing 5009 unnamed infringers and denying copyright owners to conduct
early discovery to determine the identities of the unnamed defendants).
94 Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 176–77; Hard Drive, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1165; On the Cheap,
2011 WL 4018258, at *2.
95 See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (rejecting the notion of a national community
standard in determining whether material is obscene).
96 Id.
97 Cf. Surprising Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 5 (citing estimates of growth in U.S.
pornography revenue from $230 million in 2001 to $400 million in 2006 and predicting that
“revenues from online music, games and audio-visual entertainment will far outweigh revenue from
online porn”).
98 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. § 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810
(1994)). DMCA added civil and criminal penalties for circumventing of technological measures that
copyright owners used to protect their work and tampering with copyright management
prohibitions. Id.
99 S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2009). COICA never became law. Id; see also Ashley S. Pawlisz, The
Bill of Unintended Consequences: The Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeit Act, 21
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 283, 283–84 (2011) (discussing the difficulty in finding a
remedy for online piracy and aggressive nature of COICA); see also Stephen Yagielowicz, North
American Lawmakers Grapple with Anti-Piracy Initiatives, XBIZ NEWS (Nov. 1, 2011),
http://www.xbiz.com/news/news_piece.php?id=140281&mi=all&q=protect+ip+act (discussing the
PROTECT IP Act (“PIPA”) and The Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) in the context of First
Amendment concerns).
100 S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2010); Pawlisz, supra note 99, at 283.
101 See supra note 100.
102 Id.
103 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 112 (1998); Pawlisz, supra note 99, at 283.
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content providers.104 It also had negative implications for the First Amendment
rights of American citizens.105 Accordingly, the bill never became law.106
COICA and similar acts attempt to avoid infringement by removing copyrighted
content from websites.107 These acts result in the use of increased government power
in regulating online content, resulting in burdens on internet content providers and
users.108 Further, these approaches have been designed to protect mainstream
content.109 Legislative history suggests that the benefits would not even extend to
explicit adult content (with the exception of Playboy Co.), but may actually be
harmful given the industry’s censored past.110
These measures demonstrate legislative efforts to address the internet piracy
issue on a scale that applies to all copyright owners.111 However, before sexually
explicit adult content will reap the protections of the legislation, it must first
eliminate the imbalance of copyright protection within the industry.
II. ANALYSIS
American interest in sex predates its own social acceptance.112 Conversations
about sex have slowly grown more tolerant of its recreational appeal. Still, sex has
been an important part of the nation’s history and traditions – and American
jurisprudence generally reflects these standards.113 The legal world has long
struggled to regulate adult content due to its posture with regard to moral

104 Pawlisz, supra note 99, at 283 (“While the goal of the bill is to prevent copyright
infringement, non-infringing content could also be greatly affected by the mechanisms this bill
employs, and the potential for abuse is cause for concern); see also Yagielowicz, supra note 99.
105 Pawlisz, supra note 99, at 305 (“Due to concerns that COICA is over-broad, a number of
opponents of the Bill have also argued that the number of jobs lost or businesses negatively
impacted by attempts to block domain names under COICA will outweigh the number of jobs or
revenue lost by piracy.”); Yagielowicz, supra note 99.
106 S. REP. NO. 111-373, pt. 1, (2010). The last action was on December 17, 2010 when the
Senate filed a report on the bill.
107 Richard Esguerra, Censorship of the Internet Takes Center Stage in “Online Infringement”
Bill, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/censorshipinternet-takes-center-stage-online; Gary Shapiro, Listen to the Job Creators: Oppose PIPA and
SOPA, HUFF POST TECH (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-shapiro/oppose-pipaand-sopa_b_1063468.html.
108 Pawlisz, supra note 99, at 284; Esguerra, supra note 107; Shapiro, supra note 107.
109 Shapiro, supra note 107.
110 Stephen Yagielowicz, Will SOPA Stop Internet Piracy?, XBIZ NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://www.xbiz.com/news/news_piece.php?id=141186&mi=all&q=censorship (discussing potential
ramifications of the Stop Online Piracy Act, an act similar to COICA).
111 Id.
112 Expert report and Affidavit of Bruce McLaughlin, High Five Investments, LLC, v. Floyd
County, No. 4:06-CV-00190, 2006 WL 3921135, at *3. (N.D. Ga. 2007) [hereinafter McLaughlin
Affidavit] (“Interest in sexually explicit materials dates back centuries, at least to the ancient
Mediterranean.”).
113 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing that American
adults have a right to indecent sexual content); Redrup v. N.Y., 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967) (finding for
the first time that sexually explicit speech was constitutionally protected).
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behavior,114 public health and safety,115 and freedom of expression.116 The adult
entertainment industry has consensually entered the average American home,
demonstrating the value in preserving its industry’s viability.117 Still, it has met
opponents in diverse social interest groups.118
Adult content,119 like the mainstream entertainment industry, has taken on
changing forms as technology has progressed.120 As a result, courts have constantly
had to reevaluate standards of intellectual property protection for these industries in
light of advancing technology.121 The advent of the internet and digitalized media
exemplify the court’s most recent struggle to balance American expression with
intellectual property policies.122
Part A of this analysis will address the interplay between copyright and First
Amendment policies. Part B will address the broad copyright protection given to
Playboy Co. demonstrating that adult content is, in fact, valuable expression. Part C
will demonstrate that the availability of explicit adult content online requires an
expanded definition of the “community standards” prong of the Miller test. Lastly,
Part D will suggest that judicial bias in favor of Playboy-esque content violates
copyright and First Amendment Policy.

114 Kingsley Intern. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959)
(analyzing licensing restrictions of motion pictures that “portray acts of sexual immorality”).
115 N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (identifying a valid state interest in proscribing
pornographic material depicting minors).
116 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 329 (2000) (regulating adult entertainment
establishment on the basis of secondary effects in the surrounding neighborhood. Lawmaker stated,
“We’re not talking about nudity. We’re not talking about the theatre or art . . . . We’re talking about
what is indecent and immoral . . . . We’re not prohibiting nudity, we’re prohibiting nudity when it’s
used in a lewd and immoral fashion.”).
117 Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S. at 126 (recognizing that American adults have a right to indecent
sexual content); Redrup, 386 U.S. at 770 (finding for the first time that sexually explicit speech was
constitutionally protected.).
118 See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973). As early as 1973, the court recognized that the
“sexual revolution” may have reduced irrational American “prudery” in a valuable way, but still did
not justify the need for access to hard-core material. Id. at 36; see generally Duggan, supra note 1,
at 100. Feminist theorists such as Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon have spoken out
about the repercussions of pornography. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (1985) (critiquing pornography as incompatible with female
equality).
119 McLaughlin Affidavit, supra note 112, at 3 (defining adult entertainment establishments to
include: “all sexually-oriented private clubs, adult bookstores, adult theaters and saunas/massage
parlors”).
This definition serves to distinguish adult entertainment from mainstream
entertainment.
120 Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S. at 124 (interpreting sexually oriented telephone messaging
service); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (analyzing obscene and indecent internet content).
121 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (interpreting copyright
content based on artistic expression which had not previously been considered); see also Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
122 E.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
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A. Copyright And Freedom of Expression: The Feeling is Mutual
In the Miller court’s proscription of obscene material, it recognized that the First
Amendment’s competing purpose was “bringing about political and social changes
desired by the people.”123 A more recent decision recognizes that American adults
have a constitutionally protected right to indecent sexual expression as long as it is
not “obscene” under the Miller test.124 The court limited the government’s regulation
of sexual expression to a showing of strict scrutiny because content-based restrictions
of First Amendment expression are generally disfavored.125
Where the First Amendment serves to foster political and social change as
desired by the American people,126 copyright law is purposed to expand the
availability of creative works.127 As such, there is a logical mutualistic relationship
between First Amendment expression and copyright protection in furtherance of
valuable expression.128 With regard to the adult content industry, an increased
demand for adult content evidences a corresponding increase in societal acceptance
and perceived value of such content. It logically follows that copyright law should
function to expand the availability of adult content where it meets copyright
requirements.
B. Playmates: Not Everyone’s Type
If adult content copyrights are rendered ineffective, the incentive to provide
quality sexual expression will decrease.129 This issue threatens the incentive to
create thereby reducing the production of works for public benefit.130 While
legislators have expressed concerns about obscenity in protecting adult content,131
contemporary community standards no longer warrant such a narrow interpretation
of sexual content. Even concerns about “hard-core sexual conduct” do not outweigh
the need to protect valid copyright.132

123 Id. (discussing hesitance to limit expression and citing previous precedent that, “The
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”). Chief Justice Burger
distinguished this notion by saying that “[T]he public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its
own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter.” Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15,
34–35 (1973).
124 Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S. at 125–26.
125 Id. at 126–27. In order for the government to regulate such expression, it must be able to
prove that its legitimate state interest withstands strict scrutiny. Id. To persevere against such a
high standard, “It is not enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling; the means
must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.” Id. at 127.
126 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
127 Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3,
16–17 (2001) (discussing progress as change best understood when divided into groups based on
subject matter).
128 Id.
129 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 6:3.
130 Id.
131 Devils Films, Inc., v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
132 Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
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Copyright on its own requires a very minimal showing of creativity.133 Playboy
demonstrates that explicit sexual content can meet the creativity threshold and
warrant copyright protection.134 Websites with similar content (female nudity,
sexualized plotlines, and/or simulated sex acts) warrant the same level of copyright
protection because their arrangements are similarly creative.135 Diversity in these
markets is a force that drives competition and propels content providers’ incentive to
create for American audiences consonant with copyright policy.
A main identifier in Playboy content is conscious effort at not exposing the
female genitalia.136 The vagina, although an undeniably present feature of the
female body, is an orifice that is considered inherently crude.137 The sight of the
vagina has even been aligned with fetishism and repressed fear of castration.138
Since Playboy consciously chooses not to focus on the vagina, it avoids triggering
these fears. However, obscenity law is consistently interpreted through a Playboysheltered lens, posing serious difficulties for creative protection in the rest of the
adult content industry where there is a demand for varieties of content Playboy does
not provide.139
C. Protecting the Innocent or Imposing Uniformity?
The Supreme Court has recognized a change in the composition of American
sexuality.140 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down Congressional
attempts to regulate internet content through a statute criminalizing “obscene and
indecent” internet messages.141 Reno recognized that “indecent” is too limited.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1995);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1177–78 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (granting
summary judgment and awarding $5000 for each of Playboy’s infringed copyright images); Playboy
Enters., Inc., v. Dumas and Dumas Inc., 840 F. Supp. 256, 256–60 (S.D.N.Y 1993); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Eddie Davidson, No. 1:97-CV-2787, 1999 WL 246739, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1999)
(entering default judgment in favor of Playboy in the amount of $800,000 in statutory damages
where defendant displayed copyrighted images without publisher authorization).
135 Mitchell Bros. Film Grp., v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 866 (5th Cir. 1979); Hard
Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011); MCGIP, LLC., v. Does
1-18, No. C. 11 1495, 2011 WL 2181620, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011); Boy Racer v. Does 2-71, No.
5:11 Civ. 02833, 2011 WL 2784574, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011); First Time Videos, LLC., v. Does
1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 244 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
136 Affidavit of Andrew F. Trentacosta, Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v. Terri Welles, Inc., No. 98CV-0413, 1999 WL 34982066, at ¶ 4–5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Trentacosta Affidavit]
(discussing Playboy content as less “gynecologically explicit” and less “sexually provocative or
aggressive” than other adult content providers; stating also that Playboy’s content includes “erotic
photographs of beautiful women, nude and semi-nude” in ”tasteful erotic poses”).
137 Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls! The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1108, 1136 (2005).
138 Id.
139 Greg Burns, Sex a Tough Sell in this Recession; From Playboy to Legal Brothels in Nevada,
Business Takes a Hit, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2009) (“A gasping economy has aggravated the biggest
problem in the Internet sex biz: the piracy of copyrighted content from pay sites.”).
140 Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (recognizing a change in American sexual values);
see Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
141 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997).
133
134
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Further, as recognized in Reno, the regulation was not necessary to achieve the
government interests because existing statutes already criminalized obscenity and
child pornography.142 Further, the court recognized the repercussions of limiting
valuable sexual expression.143
In its analysis, the court recognized an important state interest in protecting its
citizens from unwanted exposure to obscene material,144 but it also expressed
hesitance in regulating “any form of expression.”145 The court limited the scope of
regulation solely to works depicting or describing sexual conduct, and required the
proscribed conduct to be expressly defined in the statute.146
The ultimate
determination about whether conduct is “patently offensive” or “appeals to the
prurient interest” now depends upon contemporary community standards.147
The Miller court rejected the notion that such community standards could be
divined on a national level, stating that “[p]eople in different States vary in their
tastes and attitudes, and [such] diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of
imposed uniformity.”148
Despite opposing “imposed uniformity of community
standards” regarding obscene content, courts’ findings have peculiarly narrowed the
scope of legally protected adult content to monolithic sexuality.
More recently, government officials have spoken out against “hardcore”
pornography,149 citing harm to women as one of the evils in permitting “obscene”
online adult content.150 Absent in the argument, however, is the fact that the
supporting academic reports suggest that the most negative social messages
informing female sexuality comes from mainstream media including television
commercials, magazines, music videos and social media, as well as cosmetics and
interpersonal relationships.151 In fact, the report expressly admits that “[i]t does not
[The statute] criminalize[d] the “knowing” transmission of “obscene or indecent”
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. Section 223(d) prohibits the
“knowin[g]” sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message “that, in
context, depicts or describes, in patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”
Id. at 844.
142 Id. at 877–78; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (criminalizing obscenity); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2251
(criminalizing child pornography).
143 Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
144 Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973).
145 Id. at 24 (discussing First Amendment concerns).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 30–34 (discussing contemporary community standards).
148 Id.
149 Jamshid Ghazi Askar, Orrin Hatch, Morality in Media want President Obama to Resume
NEWS
(May
3,
2011),
Prosecution
of
Pornographers,
DESERET
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700132174/Orrin-Hatch-Morality-in-Media-want-PresidentObama-to-resume-prosecution-of-pornographers.html.
150 Id.
151 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS, REPORT OF THE
APA TASK FORCE ON THE SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS 4–14 (2008). According to the report, these
forms of sexualization “undermine confidence and comfort with one’s own body, leading to a host of
negative emotional consequences, such as shame, anxiety, and even self-disgust . . . . “[evidenced in
studies] of self-objectification (mostly using college-aged samples) and from experimental and
correlational studies of exposure to media emphasizing a narrow ideal of women’s sexual
attractiveness.” Id. at 22. The study also found an increased correlation between internalized
gender stigma and self-objectification and greater exposure to the aforementioned media sources. Id.
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review evidence concerning the prevalence and effects of sexually suggestive or
sexually explicit material per se” and “covers extreme forms of sexualization (e.g.,
prostitution, pornography, trafficking, child sexual abuse) only briefly.”152
Both of these judicial attempts are couched in a patriarchal social structure
dictating the importance of protection for helpless women and children.153 Given the
foregoing evidence, it is difficult to justify the courts’ determinations as anything but
judicial activism aimed at policing American sexuality.154 This holds especially true
since the government willingly extends protection to Playboy Co.’s content where
female virginity is regarded as a coveted male possession, and nude models are
referred to as sexy animals, or “bunnies,” instead of as women.
Despite recent judicial decisions, the Miller test is still the crucial case for
identifying obscenity.155 In applying this test to modern explicit sexual content, it is
impossible to regionally define “community standards” because so much of the
content is distributed on the internet. Since the internet allows material to be
distributed to a wider demographic,156 the argument that community standards
cannot be defined on a national level has become somewhat obsolete. When defined
at a local level, community standards are too inconsistent a standard to use in
evaluating internet content because it is broadly available to audiences all over the
country (and world, for that matter). Instead, the court should look to market
demands and adopt an approach more consonant with copyright policy.157
D. Play for Non-Boys: Hetero-Patriarchy and Judicial Bias
There are really only two cases that address the tension between obscenity and
copyright - Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatre and Devils Films,
Inc. v. Nectar Video.158 Outside of these two cases, courts have essentially avoided
addressing the issue because they have been able to dispose of the claims through
other means.159 These two cases represent opposite ends of the obscenity spectrum.
At the one end, the Mitchell court rejects copyright content restrictions, but at the
at 25. The study emphasized the importance of sexual identity, but demonstrated that girls and
young women internalized a sexual double-standard and judged women’s values based on physical
attractiveness. Id. at 26–27.
152 Id. at 4.
153 Ashlle Warnick, IFEMINISM, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1602, 1611 (2003) (discussing the antipornography movement as a form of partriarchy). “[T]rusting the patriarchal system that oppressed
women in the past to now protect women from that same patriarchy seems incongruent.” Id.
154 See generally Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 150–54 (1995) (discussing the tendency of the American judicial system to conflate
sexuality and gender into “hetero-patriarchal categories and hierarchies”).
155 Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
156 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (citing expansion of internet media and evidence of
accessibility of explicit content online).
157 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (suggesting that market
demands are an important inquiry in copyright).
158 Mitchell Bros. Film Grp., v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979); Devils
Films, Inc., v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
159 E.g., Hard Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(refusing to join unnamed infringers of copyrighted adult film).
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other end is the Devils Films, Inc. court’s willingness to expand obscenity
proscription and refuse to honor copyright owner’s rights for at least “straight anal,”
“lesbian,” and “transsexual” works.160
Case law demonstrates that the most debilitating aspect for adult content
providers is the explicit nature of their content. Where Playboy Co. has litigated its
copyright infringement claims, it has been paid deference and respect in the
courts.161 Playboy Co. has enjoyed success in the vast majority of its copyright
infringement claims.162 The court’s loyalty to the Playboy Co. brand demonstrates a
judicial bias toward sexual hegemony by favoring its “high-brow” sexual content.163
As a result, providers and consumers will be disserved if their sexual preferences do
not comply with this standard because they will be unable to access the adult content
that they seek.164 These types of evaluations are contrary to the goals of copyright
law and have been strongly disfavored throughout history.165 By only protecting the
Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433, 433–38 (S.D. Fla. 1995);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1171–78 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (analyzing
copyright infringement without assessing nature of sexual content; referring to copyrighted work as
“images” or “photography” and not “pornography”); Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Dumas and Dumas Inc.,
840 F. Supp. 256, 256–60 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (identifying plaintiff as “magazine publisher”).
162 Starware Publ’g, 900 F. Supp. at 438; Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. at 1177–78; Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Eddie Davidson, No. 1:97-CV-2787, 1999 WL 246739, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1999)
(entering default judgment in favor of Playboy in the amount of $800,000 in statutory damages
where defendant displayed copyrighted images in its website for end-users to download without
publisher authorization).
163 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (discussing the
copyright anti-discrimination principle); McCarthy, supra note 68. Playboy started out as “[s]ocalled lad magazine” focusing only on “soft porn.” Id; see also Trentacosta Affidavit, supra note 136
at ¶ 4–5 (discussing Playboy content as less “gynecologically explicit” and less “sexually provocative
or aggressive” than other adult content providers).
[Playboy] created the concept of a certain standard of quality, erotic photographs
of beautiful women, nude and semi-nude, referred to as Playmates and Playmates
of the Year. A “Playmate” pictorial is a set of photographs of models who are
photographed in a particular way, according to certain professional quality
standards . . . high quality photographic product for which its magazine has come
to be known . . . very carefully selects tasteful erotic poses for the
models . . . Consumers who buy Playboy Magazine have come to expect the high
quality photography and non-explicit content guaranteed in a Playmate pictorial.
Id.
164 See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by
Consumers in over 2,000 Cities in Forty Countries, 83 GEO.L.J. 1849, 1891 (citing soft-core category,
i.e., hetero-sexual, female nudity, without penetration, as accounting for 13.7 percent of demand
according to Carnegie Mellon study in 1995); see e.g., Devils Films, Inc., v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp.
2d 174, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting protection for more than 200 titles in categories of
“straight anal,” “lesbian,” and “transsexual” adult content); Hard Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188,
809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011); (rejecting protection of “amateur” adult content); see
also NIMMER, supra note 20, § 1.03 (“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to
the owner a secondary consideration.”); see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948) (stating that traditional copyright legislation “was intended definitely to grant valuable,
enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford greater
encouragement to the production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the world.”).
165 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52; The court has long expressed hesitance in permitting judicial
evaluations of copyright content, stating that:
160
161
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content demanded by the Playboy Co. audience, the judicial system is unfairly
limiting public benefit from sexually creative works.
E. Sex Sells: Meeting the Market Demand for Variety
Legally permissible adult content then becomes consonant with the demands of
the Playboy Co. audience: the white, heterosexual, male population.166 The result is
copyright protection is upheld only for this “high-brow” adult content.167 In stark
contrast lie the adult content providers who produce work for the rest of the
industry’s consumers.168 Obscenity begins to encompass any explicit sexual conduct
that suits the tastes of those Americans who prefer “more gynecologicaly explicit” or
“genital-focused” adult content,169 or content created for non-heterosexual viewers
(i.e., homosexual and transsexual individuals).170 Also curious is the exclusion of
protected content for female audiences, including lesbian and heterosexual women,
who are often the objects of protected content in Playboy Co.’s works.
The non-Playboy market makes up 86.3 percent of the entire industry,171 yet the
content falls outside the scope of legal protection.172 Even if some of the demand
qualifies as obscene and is not subject to First Amendment protection, the demand
demonstrates an inconsistency in the current administration of the law. The
“community standard” has been applied without considering American demands for
sexual content, subsequently violating copyright policy and demonstrating a
remarkable contradiction to principle against “imposed” standards expressed in
Miller. Moreover, explicit adult content continues to be illegally downloaded and
distributed on a mass scale,173 highlighting the gravity of infringements as adult
content producers experience increased financial loss.174
[C]opyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated
than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a
commercial value,-it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value,-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
It is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change.
That these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the
desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs' rights.

Id.

McCarthy, supra note 68.
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 239.
168 See, e.g., Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175 (providing more than 200 titles in categories of
“straight anal,” “lesbian,” and “transsexual” adult content); Hard Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188,
809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (providing “amateur” adult content).
169 Trentacosta Affidavit, supra note 136, at ¶ 4–5.
170 Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
171 Rimm, supra note 164, at 1891 (citing soft-core category, i.e., hetero-sexual, female nudity,
without penetration, as accounting for only 13.7 percent of demand according to Carnegie Mellon
study in 1995).
172 Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 176–77.
173 Bhatt, supra note 10. Stating that:
We monitored KaZaA Media Desktop traffic from our Chicago home base to see
what kind of content is being downloaded or pirated and how frequently certain
files are obtained for free instead of being purchased. We first set up a computer
for the sole purpose of housing content and being online with KaZaA Media
Desktop running 24 hours a day for 14 consecutive days. We focused on housing
166
167
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III. PROPOSAL
The best possible solution to this dilemma is to create language in the Copyright
Act that addresses the issue directly. One of the major difficulties thus far has been
a lack of clear standards in adjudicating these disputes. This section will discuss
why past attempts have failed to eradicate infringement and offer tangible steps
toward resolution.
A. Massive Joinder, Massive Headache
Congress has attempted to address internet copyright complications by enacting
the DMCA;175 however, the act provides safe harbor for qualifying service
providers,176 leaving adult content providers with limited recourse against those who
provide a way for individuals to search for illegally accessible copyrighted works.177
In contrast, P2P networks are decentralized and do not qualify for the safe
harbor provisions,178 but there are problems with litigating against these individuals
as well. Copyright owners are unable to obtain adequate information about
individual infringers, i.e. end-users, because the only known identification available
is through internet protocol addresses.179
Further, since these systems are
decentralized and file-sharing occurs between individuals (“peer-to-peer”),180

Id.

five separate categories of proprietary hardcore content, all saved as .mpg or .avi
movie files . . . . The average number of users online and downloading at a given
time was over 4 million, sharing just over 850,000 files.

174 Id. (demonstrating the extent of copyright violation by estimating that “[a]t a given price of
$100 per scene, the financial loss is averaged at $2,300 per day.”).
175 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. § 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810
(1994)).
176 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
177 Mick Haig Prod., v. Does 1-670, No. 3:10-CV-1900-N, 2011 WL 5104095, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 2011); DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does, No 10 CIV. 8760, 2011 WL 4444666, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2011); Io Grp. Inc. v. GLBT Ltd., No C-10-1282, 2011 WL 4974337, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
2011); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., 11-CV-0191, 2011 WL 3203117, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 27,
2011).
178 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
To the extent [that] activities go beyond what can fairly be characterized as
meeting the . . . collateral scope of “storage” and allied functions, and present the
elements of infringements under existing principles of copyright law, they are not
facially protected by § 512(c). Such activities simply fall beyond the bounds of the
safe harbor and liability for conducting them must be judged according to the
general law of copyright infringement. That follows from the language of
§ 512(c)(1) that “A service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of
copyright by reason of the storage . . .” However, such instances have no bearing
on the coverage of the safe harbor in all other respects.
Id.
179 See Voltage Pictures, LLC., v. Does 1-5,000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30–21 (D.D.C. 2011).
180 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005) (“[B]illions of
files are shared across peer-to-peer networks each month . . . although decentralized networks do
not reveal which files are copied and when.”).
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moderators evade liability because there is not enough evidence to sustain the claim
of direct infringement against the individual.181
Mass joinder of defendants has occurred in a limited number of cases.182 The
concept of joining defendants in a class does not really comport with traditional
American jurisprudence,183 but merely offers a short-term remedy in the absence of
functional alternatives. Further, this kind of joinder poses substantial prejudice to
the accused parties.184
The best remedy will provide recovery for injured copyright owners, deter
infringers, and provide lasting legal protection of the works. However, this challenge
is present among all copyright owners, not only those in the adult content industry.
Even though mainstream content providers have enjoyed some success in obtaining
relief for online infringement, there are still complications in efficiently litigating
against infringers, and the legal system is working tirelessly to combat these issues
because of its impact on the economy. While the big issue is in the process of being
resolved, it is imperative for adult content providers to achieve the same level of legal
recognition as other copyright owners so that when the resolution is finally available,
they will be able to enjoy the benefits of it, rather than it just being applied for
Playboy-esque content.
B. Prophylactic Measures
The DMCA has attempted to offer some relief to copyright owners, but in
addition to being ineffectual, it has also been criticized for having a chilling effect on
free speech and expression.185 Part of the problem is that the DMCA was enacted in
the early stages of the internet boom, and it was too premature to address the serious
and complex issue of digital infringement. It fails to provide reasonably obtainable
relief for both massive infringement and individual infringements. Further, it fails
to accommodate the end-users who seriously value and rely upon the internet as a
resource.
There are really two different types of infringers: website moderators and endusers.186 Infringing moderators create websites that redirect users to unauthorized
content or permit users to stream content,187 or create programs that allow users to
181 Cammarata v. Bright Imperial Ltd., No. BC 410599, 2009 WL 8394916, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Cal.
July 27, 2009).
182 Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011); Arista
Records LLC v. Does 1–19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2008); London–Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1,
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 161 n.7 (D. Mass. 2008); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d
556, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
183 See Hard Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011); On
the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, No. C10-4472, 2011 WL 4018258, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).
184 On the Cheap, WL 4018258, at *1.
185 Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the
DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 173 (2010).
186 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005).
187 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (entering
judgment); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1174–78 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (finding copyright infringement where “images in issue were stored in defendants’ “web
server” computers and available for downloading by subscribers”).

[11:815 2012]

Cybersex: Protecting Sexual Content
in the Digital Age

837

share unauthorized content with one another.188 Infringing end-users access
websites where they can view unauthorized content,189 upload (“seed”) and/or
download (“leech”) unauthorized content through file-sharing systems.190
The difference in levels of infringement necessitates varying degrees in remedy.
It is not equitable to hold one individual accountable for downloading one work one
time when another individual uploaded the same work on fifty separate occasions.
As a result, an applicable cause of action should address these issues.
1. Getting Defensive: Putting Infringers On Notice
Adult content producers have begun to take this issue into their own hands by
hiring companies to issue cease-and-desist letters for infringing websites.191 The
work has proven effective in terms of forcing infringers to comply with the law.192 It
has also helped to avoid litigation related costs.193 Unfortunately, there is still
economic injury.194 Further, this approach has placed the burden entirely onto the
copyright owner,195 and has failed to provide a legal remedy for legal wrong.196 The
content at issue is valuable sexual expression, and is deserving of the court’s
cooperation in mitigating financial loss and preserving exclusive rights of copyright
ownership.197
In order to institute an alternative cause of action against these infringers,
copyright owners should begin by sending a “cease-and-desist” letter to violating
party or parties to demonstrate good faith in identifying actual infringements. This
letter puts the infringer on notice that his or her conduct is considered an
unauthorized copyright infringement, and it shifts the burden to investigate the
infringement onto the accused infringer. If the copyrighted work is not removed, the
copyright owner should then be entitled to equitable relief to prevent further injury
from the infringement.198 The violating party should also be required to pay damages
to the plaintiff in varying degrees for moderators and end-users.
Where a moderator hosts a copyrighted work on a website in the absence of a
license from the copyright owner, the infringing party should have to pay restitution
188 Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 913. (“Billions of files are shared across peer-to-peer networks
each month . . . although decentralized networks do not reveal which files are copied and when.”).
189 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. at 346; see Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. at 1174.
190 Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 913.
191 Glass, supra note 11.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Kathee Brewer, Down the Tubes, ADULT VIDEO NETWORK (Feb. 2, 2008, 10:57 AM),
http://business.avn.com/articles/technology/Down-the-Tubes-28340.html (“Revenue shrinkage has
reached epidemic proportions among traditional San Fernando Valley adult-entertainment
companies; for some, video revenue has plunged by as much as 50 percent from its peak.”).
195 MJ McMahon, Evan Horowitz, Co-founder, XPays, ADULT VIDEO NETWORK (Jan. 4, 2007),
http://business.avn.com/executive-suite/Evan-Horowitz-Co-founder-XPays-66404.html.
196 1A C.J.S. ACTIONS § 60 (2011) (requiring a legal wrong to warrant the grant of a legal
remedy).
197 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 6:3.
198 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (citing temporary and final injunction as possible remedy for
copyright infringement).
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to the copyright owner.199 In contrast, an end-user should have to pay punitive
damages: e.g., an amount reaching not more than three times the market price of
the infringed work. These actions would be subject to affirmative defense of fair
use.200
Further, damages could be overturned upon the accused infringer’s
demonstration of a valid copy of the work or a subscription to the copyright owner’s
content.
Since the infringing party will have adequate notice of their infringement and is
given time to investigate the infringement, it cannot be construed as chilling speech.
Additionally, unlike the DMCA, this cause of action would be subject to both fair use
and validity defenses. Although there still may be procedural issues, it equalizes the
burden on the original copyright creator and the public. This remedy ultimately
comports with Copyright and First Amendment policies by rewarding creators and
simultaneously promoting valuable expression for the public benefit.
2. Making Copyright Sexy
While authorities have attempted to remedy massive online copyright
infringement, the issue has grown and remained largely unresolved. In the adult
content industry, as previously demonstrated, there is a divergence in levels of
protection between certain types of content. The adult content industry necessitates
legislative attention in equalizing protection among American preferences in sexual
media. The ultimate remedy will eradicate biases in judicial enforcement of sexual
mores, sexually repressive behaviors, and patriarchal structures in governing sex.201
It is important for policy makers and legislators to be acutely sensitive to the
existence of biases in the legal system.202 When biases are identified, they need to be
evaluated in light of the interests they protect or threaten.203
The relationship between Copyright and the First Amendment cannot be denied.
These two constitutional principles operate together to propel progress in American
society.204 As such, one should not be used to inhibit the other.205 Copyright has its

199 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1997);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Eddie Davidson, No. 1:97-CV-2787, 1999 WL 246739, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
12, 1999).
200 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
201 See Rimm, supra note 164, at 1891 (discussing expansive demands in the adult content
industry); Warnick, supra note 153, at 1611 (discussing the anti-pornography movement as a form of
partriarchy); Valdes, supra note 154, at 150–54 (discussing the tendency of the American judicial
system to conflate sexuality and gender into “hetero-patriarchal categories and hierarchies”).
202 Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3,
16–17 (2001).
203 Valdes, supra note 154, at 150–54.
204 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress with power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;”) with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”).
205 Mitchell Bros. Film Grp., v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 854–55 (5th Cir. 1979).
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own set of principles that govern content-based analyses and should not be limited by
the restrictive proscription of explicit adult content.206
There are important alterations to be made which will effectuate equitable
copyright protection among the Playboy-esque content providers as well as the more
“explicit” content providers. The superior method of achieving this end is to create
language in the Copyright Act that addresses the issue directly. The Copyright Act
should be amended to reflect the fact that the internet is a permanent change to the
expressive media in our society as previously recommended. In order to address the
inequities in the adult content industry specifically, the Act should clarify the proper
reach of obscenity in evaluating copyright content.
The Supreme Court has attempted to recognize the value of American sexual
expression,207 and Congress has separately recognized the importance in ensuring
intellectual property protection in a digital world.208 However, neither has expressly
addressed sexually expressive content in copyright law.
It is important to address sexually expressive content specifically because past
practice demonstrates that legislative attempts to protect mainstream content will
not be interpreted to include sexually expressive content.209 Or, in the event that it is
interpreted to include sexually expressive content, precedent demonstrates judicial
hesitance to protect anything beyond Playboy-esque content.210 Therefore, these
attempts fail to provide functional copyright protection for explicit adult content
providers who already struggle with issues of censorship and basic inequality in
accessing the courts.211 By explicitly recognizing adult content as legitimately
copyrightable subject matter, it will more clearly identify the judicial biases that
have applied an outmoded sexual standard in copyright law and illuminate policy
conflicts in applications of the laws.

206 See id. (explaining that “Congress has seldom added restrictions on copyright based on the
subject matter of the work, and in each instance has later removed the content restriction.”).
207 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing that American
adults have a right to indecent sexual content); see also Expert Report and Affidavit of Bruce
McLaughlin, High Five Investments, LLC, v. Floyd County, No. 4:06-CV-00190, 2006 WL 3921135,
at *3. (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Interest in sexually explicit materials dates back centuries, at least to the
ancient Mediterranean. However, for many years, selling sexually oriented materials was a
‘hazardous profession.’”); Redrup v. N.Y., 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967) (finding for the first time that
sexually explicit speech was constitutionally protected).
208 S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 112 (1998); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (1994).
209 Contrast Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Call
of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011); with Boy Racer v. Does
2-71, No. 5:11 Civ. 02833, 2011 WL 2784574, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011).
210 Contrast Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433, 438 (S.D. Fla.
1995) (granting summary judgment in favor of Playboy’s copyright infringement claim against a CDROM manufacturer who copied images onto discs without authorization); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1177–78 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (granting summary judgment and
awarding $5000 for each infringed copyright image); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Eddie Davidson,
No. 1:97-CV-2787, 1999 WL 246739, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1999) (entering default judgment in
favor of Playboy); with Hard Drive Prod., Inc., v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal.
2011).
211 Yagielowicz, supra note 99 (discussing the COICA, SOPA, PIPA, and their opponents fear of
impending censorship); Esguerra, supra note 107 (citing the potential risks of COICA to free
speech).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing argument sets forth the bases for copyright protection of adult
content under the 1976 Copyright Act,212 and it grounds itself in copyright policy.213
It is important to offer protection for the creators of adult content to satisfy the public
demand and prevent creative sexual content from becoming homogenized.214 The
1976 Act, while recognizing various forms of media,215 could not have anticipated the
advent of the internet as a medium of Copyrighted works.216
The capacity to infringe on this scale did not become a problem until recently,
and adjudications have been inconsistent across the board.217 While seeking to
protect the legal rights of accused infringers, the balance has begun to veer towards
inequity. Moreover, adjudicators have exhibited sexually repressive biases by ruling
against adult content copyrights which contradicts the very core of copyright policy.
In the age of cybersex and digital sexual gratification, the public demands variety in
the adult content market. And this demand is for instant, digital accessibility.
Luckily, adult media is valuable expression and copyright policy does not
discriminate based on taste. The problem is that until explicit language clarifies
applications of Copyright law regarding sexual adult media and provides remedies
for online providers, judicial bias will keep copyright from being truly sexy..

17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006).
NIMMER, supra note 20, § 1.03; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
214 Washingtonian Pub. Co., Inc., v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
215 17 U.S.C. § 102.
212
213

